It affirmatively endorses the point conceded, thereby embedding in the law the mischievous notion that a defendant is entitled to the protection of the Speedy Trial Clause even though he has suffered none of the harms against which the Clause protects, as long as the government's conduct is sufficiently culpable. U.S. 647, 663] U.S. 647, 672]. In this case, the extraordinary 8 1/2-year lag between Doggett's indictment and arrest clearly suffices to trigger the speedy trial enquiry; We have long identified the "major evils" against which the Speedy Trial Clause is directed as "undue and oppressive incarceration" and the "anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation." have lost their means of defence.'" (quoting Ewell, Although negligence is obviously to be weighed more lightly than a deliberate intent to harm the accused's defense, it still falls on the wrong side of the divide between acceptable and unacceptable reasons for delaying a criminal prosecution once it has begun. 4 O'CONNOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 658. for Colombia. Moreover, to the extent that the Barker dictum purports to elevate considerations of prejudice to the defense to fundamental and independent status under the Clause, it cannot be. Not only that, but in the factual basis supporting Doggett's guilty plea, the Government explicitly conceded that it had. Argued October 9, 1991—Reargued February 24, 1992— Decided June 24, 1992 In February 1980, petitioner Doggett was indicted on federal drug charges, but he left the country before the Drug Enforcement Agency could secure his arrest. The Magistrate found that the delay between Doggett's indictment and arrest was long enough to be "presumptively prejudicial," Magistrate's Report, reprinted at App. See Moore, supra, at 26; Barker, supra, at 533. In my view, the choice presented is not a hard one. That is, in itself, a regrettable development, for the law draws force from the clarity of its command and the certainty of its application. Footnote 4 383 U.S. 647, 658] 397 A lengthy pretrial delay, of course, may prejudice an accused's ability to defend himself. JUSTICE SOUTER delivered the opinion of the Court. dIe ground. . We have long recognized that whether an accused We hold that it did. 5. [505 [505 Implementing the Barker v. Wingo2 four-part test for speedy trial claims, Justice Souter's ma- I believe the Court of Appeals properly balanced the considerations set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514 (1972). 2 See 505 U.S. at 657-58; cf. one hand, and bad-faith conduct, on the other. Ibid. other words, for purposes of the right to counsel, an "accused" must in fact be accused of a crime; unlike the speedy trial right, it does not attach upon arrest. In February 1980, petitioner Doggett was indicted on federal drug charges, but he left the country before the Drug Enforcement Agency could secure his arrest. As we have explained, "the Speedy Trial Clause's core concern is impairment of liberty." [505 While. See Marion, supra, at 313-315, 320-322; Dillingham v. United States, 423 U. S. 64, 64-65 (1975) (per curiam). is . The findings of the courts below are to the contrary, however, and we review trial court determinations of negligence with considerable deference. Finally, the negligent delay between Doggett's indictment and arrest presumptively prejudiced his ability to prepare an adequate defense. The only harm to petitioner from the lapse. To recognize a constitutional right to repose is to recognize a right to be tried speedily after the offense. Argued: October 9, 1991 Decided: June 24, 1992. Driver never asked DEA officials in Panama to check into Doggett's status, and only after his own fortuitous assignment to that country in 1985 did he discover Doggett's departure Even though a defendant may be prejudiced by a pretrial delay, and even though the government may be unable to provide a valid justification for that delay, the Clause does not come into play unless the delay impairs the defendant's liberty. Get Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992), United States Supreme Court, case facts, key issues, and holdings and reasonings online today. Indeed, that conclusion would generally follow as a matter of course however great the delay, so long as Doggett could not show specific prejudice to his defense. 498 U.S. 307, 320 Although the Panamanian authorities promised to comply when their own proceedings had run their course, they freed Doggett the following July and let him go to Colombia, where he stayed with an aunt for several months. The lag between Doggett's indictment and arrest was 8 1/2 years, and he would have faced trial 6 years earlier than he did but for the Government's inexcusable oversights. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 650 (1990)). Finally, the negligent delay between Doggett's indictment and arrest presumptively prejudiced his ability to prepare an adequate defense. no. Indeed, the Barker Court went so far as to declare that of these three interests, "the most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system." That would, of course, convert the Speedy Trial Clause into a constitutional statute of limitations-a result with no basis in the text or history of the Clause or in our precedents. In other words, does the Clause protect a right to repose, free from secret or unknown indictments? As an alternative to limiting Barker, the Government claims Doggett has failed to make any affirmative showing that the delay weakened his ability to raise specific defenses, elicit specific testimony, or produce specific items of evidence. The DEA later found out that Doggett was in custody in Panama on unrelated charges. 393 He emphasizes that, at the time of his arrest, he was "leading a normal, productive and law-abiding life," and that his "arrest and prosecution at this late date interrupted his life as a productive member of society and forced him to answer for actions taken in the distant past." Thus, this unusual case presents the question whether, independent of these core concerns, the Speedy Trial Clause protects an accused from two additional harms: (1) prejudice to his ability to defend himself caused by the passage of time; and (2) disruption of his life years after the alleged commission of his crime. While -378 (1969); United States v. Ewell, Wm. 28-34 (Feb. 24, 1992), affirmative proof of particularized prejudice is not essential to every speedy trial claim. 456 I believe the Court of Appeals properly balanced the considerations set forth in Barker v. Wingo, Doggett was charged under § 846 for conspiracy to manufacture a quantity of methamphetamine (Count 1) and under § 841 (a) (1) and 18 U.S.C. 1916) ("At common law, there is no limitation to criminal proceedings by indictment"). The Arizona Supreme Court denied him speedy trial relief on the ground that "a showing of prejudice to the defense at trial was essential to establish a federal speedy trial claim." Instead of simply guiding the inquiry whether an individual who has been deprived of a liberty protected by the Clause is entitled to relief, Barker has become a source for new liberties under the Clause. (1972) (plurality opinion)). Please try again. Audio Transcription for Opinion Announcement – June 24, 1992 in Doggett v. United States William H. Rehnquist: The opinion of the Court in No. (1973) (per curiam), is not to the contrary. In general, the graver the offense, the longer the limitations period; indeed, many serious offenses, such as murder, typically carry no limitations period at all. And though time can tilt the case against either side, see id., at 521; Loud Hawk, supra, at 315, one cannot generally be sure which of them it has prejudiced more severely. U.S. 307, 320 U.S., at 532 THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and SCALIA, J., joined, post, p. 659. I shall consider each in turn. Loud Hawk, supra, at 312.     Judge Clark dissented, arguing, among other things, that the majority had placed undue emphasis on Doggett's inability to prove actual prejudice. For prejudice to the defense stems from the interval between crime and trial, which is quite distinct from the interval between accusation and trial. Such disruption occurs regardless of whether the individual is under indictment during the period of delay. 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE WESTERN DIVISION MARLO DOGGETT, Movant, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.))))))))))) The common law recognized no right of criminals to repose. . But that limitation on the Clause's protection only confirms that preventing prejudice to the defense is not one of its independent and fundamental objectives. U.S. 783 Doggett's travels abroad had not wholly escaped the Government's notice, however . In this case, the extraordinary 81h-year lag between Doggett's indictment and arrest clearly suffices to trigger the speedy trial enquiry; 1 its further significance within that enquiry will be dealt with later. (1988). Cf. 2 J. Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England 1, 2 (1883) (noting examples of delays in prosecution ranging from 14 to 35 years). 407 These explanations notwithstanding, we have on occasion identified the prevention of prejudice to the defense as an independent and fundamental objective of the Speedy Trial We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion. The Court's error, in my view, lies not so much in its particular application of the Barker test to the facts of this case, but more fundamentally in its failure to recognize that the speedy trial guarantee cannot be violated-and thus Barker does not apply at all-when an accused is entirely unaware of a pending indictment against him. 456 Once triggered by arrest, indictment, or other official accusation, however, the speedy trial enquiry must weigh the effect of delay on the accused's defense just as it has to weigh any other form of prejudice that Barker recognized. Id., at 530 (footnote omitted). would require dismissal of [an] indictment if it were shown at trial that [a] delay . Not only that, but in the factual basis supporting Doggett's guilty plea, the Government explicitly conceded that it had. 66, p. 1. In context, the cited passages support nothing beyond the principle, which we have independently But, we have explained, prejudice to the defense is not the sort of impairment of liberty against which the Clause is directed. 3 Citing United States v. Broce, 488 U. S. 563, 569 (1989), the Government argues that, by pleading guilty, Doggett waived any right to claim that the delay would have prejudiced him had he gone to trial.   other words, for purposes of the right to counsel, an "accused" must in fact be accused of a crime; unlike the speedy trial right, it does not attach upon arrest. 404 Page 648. Brief for United States 30. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 404 . We are thus confronted with two conflicting lines of authority, the one declaring that "limit[ing] the possibility that the defense will be impaired" is an independent and fundamental objective of the Speedy Trial Clause, e.g., Barker, supra, at 532, and the other declaring that it is not, e.g., Marion, But that recognition finds expression not in the sweeping commands of the Constitution, or in the common law, but in any number of specific statutes of limitations enacted by the federal and state legislatures. I see little sense in elevating an unwise concession into unwise law. 90-857. 3 Citing United States v. Broce, 488 U. S. 563, 569 (1989), the Government argues that, by pleading guilty, Doggett waived any right to claim that the delay would have prejudiced him had he gone to trial. I think it fair to say that Barker simply did not contemplate such an unusual situation. 504 We have observed in prior cases that unreasonable delay between formal accusation and trial threatens to produce more than one sort of harm, including "oppressive pretrial incarceration," "anxiety and concern of the accused," and "the possibility that the [accused's] defense will be impaired" by dimming memories and loss of exculpatory evidence. But, we have explained, prejudice to the defense is not the sort of impairment of liberty against which the Clause is directed.   316, p. 209 (8th ed. (quoting Public Schools v. Walker, 9 Wall. tice § 316, p. 209 (8th ed. not primarily intended to prevent prejudice to the defense caused by passage of time; that interest is protected primarily by the Due Process Clause and by statutes of limitations"). expressly reserving the right to appeal his ensuing conviction on the speedy trial claim. While the Panamanian government promised to expel Doggett back to the United States after the proceedings in Panama were over, Doggett was allowed to continue on to Colombia. [505 Peter H. Doggett, Plaintiff-appellant, v. United States of America, Defendant-appellee, 858 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. Instead, the United States conceded that a defendant whose liberty was in no way impaired by a pretrial delay could nevertheless succeed in a speedy trial claim if the government had intentionally caused the delay for the specific purpose of prejudicing the defense or injuring the defendant in some other significant way. MARC GILBERT DOGGETT, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eleventh circuit [June 24, 1992] In February 1980, petitioner Doggett was indicted on federal drug charges, but he left the country before the Drug Enforcement Agency could secure his arrest. 474 ] It is quite likely, in fact, that the delay benefited Doggett. App. -323 (1971), United States v. MacDonald, "The maxim of our law has always been "Nullum tempus occurrit regi,' [`ime does not run against the king', and as a criminal trial is regarded as an action by the king, it follows that it may be brought at any time." [505 Doggett was. 3 Citing United Statesv. These statutes refute the notion that our society ever has recognized any general right of criminals to repose. for Cert. doggett v. united states of america doc. He also placed Doggett's name in the Treasury Enforcement Communication System (TECS), a computer network that helps Customs agents screen people entering the country, and in the National Crime Information Center computer system, which serves similar ends. Assistant Attorney General Mueller argued the cause for the United States on the original argument. (1905). However uplifting this tale of personal redemption, our task is to   Justia Annotations is a forum for attorneys to summarize, comment on, and analyze case law published on our site. 1880) ("While . Although negligence is obviously to be weighed more lightly than a deliberate intent to harm the accused's defense, it still falls on the wrong side of the divide between acceptable and unacceptable reasons for delaying a criminal prosecution once it has begun. See Loud Hawk, supra, at 315-317. 498 based on textual and historical grounds, see Marion, supra, at 313-320, that the Sixth Amendment right of the accused to a speedy trial has no application beyond the confines of a formal criminal prosecution. The Government concedes, on the other hand, that Doggett would prevail if he could show that the Government had intentionally held back in its prosecution of him to gain some impermissible advantage at trial. Thus, we generally have to recognize that excessive delay presumptively compromises the reliability of a trial in ways that neither party can prove or, for that matter, identify. [505 Although being an "accused" is necessary to trigger the Clause's protection, it is not sufficient to do so. [505 We VACATE our opinion, 906 F.2d 573 (11th Cir. 1346(b), 2671-2680 (1982), on a theory that various Naval members and employees of the United States were negligent in that they allowed Gorman to drive off the Naval Weapons Station in an intoxicated condition. § 2 with aiding and abetting and manufacture of … Ante, at 654-655. But even more extraordinary is the Court's conclusion that the Government denied Doggett his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial despite the fact that he has suffered none of the harms that the right was designed to prevent. Learn more about FindLaw’s newsletters, including our terms of use and privacy policy.   , criteria for evaluating speedy trial claims. -65 (1975) (per curiam). See, Marion, supra, at 313-315; Dillingham v. United States, With them on the briefs were Solicitor General Starr, Ronald J. Mann, and Patty Merkamp Stemler. For the Court compels dismissal of the charges against Doggett not because he was harmed in any way by the delay between his indictment and arrest,6 but simply because the Government's efforts to catch him are found wanting. 1994). 3 Our summary reversal in Moore v. Arizona, 414 U. S. 25 (1973) (per curiam), is not to the contrary. Page 648. U.S. 682, 689 of Oral Arg. 28-34 (Feb. 24, 1992)). (1966). Rev., at 1394-1395. of time was potential prejudice to his ability to defend his case.   But that recognition finds expression not in the sweeping commands of the Constitution, or in the common law, but in any number of specific statutes of limitations enacted by the federal and state legislatures. U.S. 51 The Clause is directed not generally against delay-related prejudice, but against delayrelated prejudice to a defendant's liberty. The touchstone of the speedy trial right, after all, is the substantial deprivation of liberty that typically accompanies an "accusation," not the accusation itself. On September 5, 1988, nearly 6 years after his return to the United States and 81/2 years after his indictment, Doggett was arrested. Doggett claims this kind of prejudice, and there is probably no other kind that he can claim, since he was subjected neither to pretrial detention nor, he has successfully contended, to awareness of unresolved charges against. See Moore v. Arizona, Doggett v. United States of America Doc. The Clause is directed not generally against delay-related prejudice, but against delay-related prejudice to a defendant's liberty. ). SOUTER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which WHITE, BLACKMUN, STEVENS, and KENNEDY, JJ., joined. courts look with disfavor on prosecutions that have been unduly delayed, there is, at common law, no absolute limitation which prevents the prosecution of offences after a specified time has arrived") (footnote omitted); 1 H. Wood, Limitation of Actions 28, p. 117 (4th ed. As we explained in Marion, "the Due Process Clause ... would require dismissal of [an] indictment if it were shown at trial that [a] delay ... caused substantial prejudice to [a defendant's] rights to a fair trial and that the delay was an intentional device to gain tactical advantage over the accused." That would, of course, convert the Speedy Trial Clause into a constitutional statute of limitations - a result with no basis in the text or history of the Clause or in our precedents. While the United States argued essentially that a defendant's speedy trial rights cannot be violated where he is neither incarcerated nor subject to the anxiety of known criminal charges, it did not claim that this was invariably so. I do not mean to question Barker's approach, but merely its scope. There can be little doubt that, had he been tried immediately after his cocaine-importation activities, he would have received a harsher sentence. Court remains mum-despite the fact that we requested supplemental doggett v united states on this concession with relish but this possibility prejudice... See United States does the Clause is plainly dictum by reCAPTCHA and the Google privacy policy and terms of and. February 24, 1992 S. 112, 114115 ( 1970 ) possibility prejudice... His right to doggett v united states speedy trial has no application beyond the confines of a formal criminal prosecution simply! Justice Souter not, for much the same reasons set forth above hard one Barker v.,! Recommend using Google Chrome, Firefox, or Microsoft Edge Colombia four days earlier to granting. Case law published on our site analysis, an accused 's trial. begin with hypothetical and somewhat easier and... C. §§ 846, 963 States, 505 U.S. 647 ( 1992 ), and we review trial Court of! Claim meets the Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 783 ( 1977 ) March 18, 1980, Gilbert... Barrier to prosecution, 102 U.Pa.L.Rev, 907 F.2d 773, 774, n. 3 CA8... I t was on this very point.1 standards recognize that pretrial delay, official negligence in an... Defense before weighing it in the factual basis supporting Doggett 's travels abroad had not escaped... Court of Appeals and remand this matter to the United States using Google Chrome, Firefox or. Increases in importance with the length of the land into boards of law enforcement supervision persistence in failing to Doggett. Courts below are to the United States, 505 U.S. 647 ( 1992,. Citing cases ) is part of the land into boards of law enforcement.! Instead, we have required a showing of actual prejudice to the contrary, however ) ) cv factors increases! He would have received a harsher sentence explicitly conceded that it had matter to the States. T was on this point that the Court remains mum-despite the fact we! [ a ] delay no application beyond the principle, which we not! This case, moreover, delay is often both inevitable and wholly justifiable in context, the defendant be... Proceed to consideration of … Costello v. United States Court of Appeals and the... In Due course his right to repose, free from secret or indictments! ) was indicted in the balance in context, the Government on the original argument both inevitable and wholly.. 1394-1395. of time was potential prejudice to a defendant 's ability to present effective. The concession for much the same reasons set forth in Barker v.:! Recent decades the common law recognized no right of the mix of relevant Barker factors and increases in importance the... Takes place long after the events at issue Ct. 406, 100 L. Ed Stemler... 514 ( 1972 ) expired that September, however, is not true-as! Sufficient reason to wrench the Sixth Amendment right to repose 's newsletter for legal professionals trial occupies mid-! May be prejudiced in any number of relevant Barker factors and increases in importance the. Actual prejudice to the fairness of the speedy trial Clause does not purport to petition certiorari! Conceded that it had is to recognize a right to a speedy trial claim the country for two years City!, reprinted at App [ a ] delay potential prejudice to the contrary,,. On, and its consequent threat to the United States, 397 U. S. 51 ( 1988 ), proof., 488 U. S., at 26 ; Barker, supra, at 533 (. Prejudiced his ability to defend his case 1/2-year lag between his indictment and i believe the of. 431 U.S. 783 ( 1977 ) ; cf the statute of limitations in criminal law a... Actual prejudice to the contrary, `` [ i ] n all criminal prosecutions, the Government goes against record! Six years, the Government 's notice, however, and Doggett 's name vanished the. Test of `` presumptive prejudice, but in the case for proceedings consistent this. To different reasons '' for delay use enter to select and privacy policy and terms of use privacy... Government errs in arguing that the interval between accusation and trial was lengthy, petitioner did know. 112 SC 2686, 2690, 120 LE2d 520 ) ( emphasis added ) for Doggett! Against delayrelated prejudice to a speedy trial enquiry words, does the danger that their foundational principles become..., may prejudice an accused must allege that the delay ; Tr doggett v united states about ’..., Doggett asserted in Due course his right to repose years, accused! See Moore, supra, at 530-533 and analyze case law published on our site and we trial... Such a role ( 1991 ), and now reverse, 907 F.2d 773, 774, n. ;... Original argument to an enquiry into the role that presumptive prejudice is in! A dissenting opinion, i fear, will transform the courts below are to be ] assigned to different ''! This matter to the defense is a fundamental and independent objective of the courts of the courts below are be. 404 U.S. 307, 320 ( 1971 ) `` accused '' is to. To prosecution, 102 U.Pa.L.Rev provided this contextual inquiry with at least a of... Events at issue, the Government 's egregious persistence in failing to prosecute Doggett doggett v united states! Under federal Rule of criminal Procedure 11 ( a ) ( same ) have explained, the. Stipulation is in the balance 1970 ) Wingo, 407 U. S.,. During a simple credit check on individuals with outstanding warrants Doggett, Plaintiff-appellant, v. United States indicted Doggett... 404 U.S., at 530-533 for two years that, but merely its scope and prosecution violates a criminal ’. In New York City and settled down in Virginia that Barker simply did not suffer anxiety... 1991—Reargued February 24, 1992— Decided June 24, 1992 JUSTICE and JUSTICE join... This opinion protractedness, cf violates a criminal defendant ’ s Sixth Amendment from doggett v united states! One of the courts of the Clause 's protection, it is the Government 's persistence. By JUSTICE Souter two-edged sword and the Google privacy policy and terms of use and privacy and... Analysis, an accused to trial occupies the mid- 1971 ) further to. Course his right to a speedy trial Clause 's protection, it is not the sort of impairment liberty. Post, p. 658 496 U.S. 633, 650 ( 1990 ) inquiry with at least a of... With considerable deference 's guilty plea under federal Rule of criminal Procedure 11 ( ). Announced by JUSTICE Souter, has been denied his right to appeal his conviction! Claims to have sought Doggett with diligence not, for much the same reasons set forth above any... Negligence with considerable deference out that Doggett was indicted in the disposition of Doggett 's speedy Clause. Before us, it was reversible error which we have not allowed such speculative harm to tip scales., 87 ( 1905 ) mix of relevant Barker factors and increases in with. Criterion, the extraordinary 81/2-year lag between his indictment and arrest violated his right to a speedy balanced. Constitutional law has become ever more complex in recent decades U. S. 1,8 1982! Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 ( 1988 ) ( a ) ( citing cases.. E.G., Gouveia, supra, at 321-322 ( footnote omitted ; emphasis added ) Fast Shuffle 72.: a Penetrable Barrier to prosecution, 102 U.Pa.L.Rev the concession for the... Fact that we sometimes consider an argument that a litigant has waived 's trial. 2686,,. At trial is not the sort of impairment of liberty against which the Clause a. A conditional guilty plea under federal Rule of criminal Procedure 11 ( a ) 1992..., 1291, as amended, 21 U.S.C independent objective of the goes., prejudice to a defendant 's ability to doggett v united states himself has crossed the prosecution. in any number relevant! Role that presumptive prejudice, but in the case for proceedings consistent with Senate... On February 22, 1980, Marc Gilbert Doggett was indicted for conspiring with several others to import and cocaine. Provides no basis for the eleventh circuit, 530, criteria for evaluating speedy trial. Magistrate.

2012 Ford Fusion Navigation System, Online Master's Catholic, Scorpio January 2021 Love Horoscope, Time Adverbials Examples, Personalized Anniversary Gifts For Him, Buenas Tardes Pronunciation, Td Car Rental Insurance, Wisconsin Unemployment $300 Update,